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Intentionalism in Aesthetics 
Paisley Livingston 
Intentionalism in aesthetics is, quite generally, the thesis that 
the artist's or artists' intentions have a decisive role in the creation 
of a work of art, and that knowledge of such intentions is a necessary 
component of at least some adequate interpretive and evaluative claims.1 
In this paper I develop and defend this thesis. I begin with a discussion 
of some anti-intentionalist arguments. Surveying a range of intentionalist 
responses to them, I briefly introduce and criticize a fictionalist version 
of intentionalism before moving on to an approach I call moderate 
intentionalism. I consider a salient alternative known as hypothetical 
intentionalism and try to show why moderate intentionalism should be 
preferred to it. 
Saying what, precisely, intentions are is no small problem, and 
disputes in aesthetics often hinge on rival assumptions about the nature 
and function of intentions in general. I shall assume, in what follows, 
that intentions are mental states having semantic contents, various 
psychological functions, and practical consequences?but not always the 
targetted results.21 shall not take up any of the more global challenges 
to intentionalist psychology, such as eliminative materialism or macro 
sociological and historicist critiques.3 I assume, then, that agents some 
times intend to perform an action, such as writing a poem, and that they 
occasionally succeed in realizing such aims, thereby intentionally doing 
such things as writing poems. 
I. Extreme Intentionalism and Anti-Intentionalism 
In an extreme version, intentionalism holds that a work's meanings 
and its maker's intentions are logically equivalent. Such a thesis still has 
its defenders, yet it is hard to see how it can be reconciled with the fact 
that intentions are not 
always successfully realized. A theory of interpre 
tation based on Humpty Dumpty's semantics does not seem promising.4 
An extreme version of anti-intentionalism also has its advocates, who 
confront the intentionalist with the following dilemma: either the artist's 
intentions are successfully realized in the text or structure produced by 
the artist, in which case the interpreter need not refer to them; or, the 
New Literary History, 1998, 29: 831-846 
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artist's intentions are not successfully realized, in which case reference 
to them is insufficient to justify a related claim about the work's 
meanings. Any viable form of intentionalism must find a way out of this 
dilemma. 
A premise of many anti-intentionalist arguments?including the di 
lemma just mentioned?is that if a work has determinate meanings and 
value, they must be immanent in the artistic text or structure. This sort 
of empiricism in aesthetics is vulnerable to some powerful criticisms. 
Not all of the artistically or aesthetically relevant features of a work of art 
are intrinsic properties of the text; some are relational and can only be 
known when the text or structure is cognized correctly in the context of 
its creation. In making this point, a number of philosophers, such as 
Arthur Danto, David Davies, Jerrold Levinson, and Gregory Currie, have 
evoked versions of Jorge Luis Borges 's fictional example of Pierre 
Menard: tokens of the same text-type, created in different contexts, 
manifest different, artistically relevant relational features; to know which 
features are those of one work as 
opposed to another work, one must 
interpret the text in its context of creation.5 
Once attention has been drawn to the constitutive status of a work's 
relational properties, cogent responses to the anti-intentionalist di 
lemma can be formulated. The intentionalist can argue that some 
successfully realized intentions are not simply redundant with regard to 
the text's intrinsic features. An example is the intention that a certain 
meaning be unstated in the text yet implicitly expressed by the work. 
Even when the intentions are 
successfully realized, such relations are not 
immanent in the final artistic structure or text and cannot be simply 
read off from the latter. Intentionalists also contend that whenever our 
goal is to evaluate a work as a certain kind of achievement, the artist's 
intentions, including unsuccessfully executed ones, are always relevant, 
because part of what we want to do is take note of the manner and extent 
of the artist's realization of the relevant aims. Although it is not the case 
that success at 
realizing one's intentions entails success at creating 
a 
valuable work, success or failure in realizing intentions does have 
implications for the kind of value a work possesses, if only because there 
is a significant and relevant difference between lucky and skillful 
creative activities. No?l Carroll contends, for example, that Ed Wood's 
Plan 9 From Outer Space would have been a better film had the director 
been trying to make a parody. What one sees and hears at 
a 
screening of 
this movie is logically compatible with such an intention, but our 
knowledge that the director in fact had no such intention is decisive, 
and we cannot justifiably praise the film as a clever parody.6 So the 
dilemma can be avoided: knowledge of the relation between an artist's 
intentions and the resulting structure is necessary to at least some 
interpretive and evaluative claims. 
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One way in which anti-intentionalists challenge even modest versions 
of intentionalism is to evoke epistemological worries about the difficulty 
or impossibility of obtaining reliable knowledge of intentions. Usually 
this amounts to an unjustified demand for a kind of infallible justifica 
tion or proof that is unattainable in any empirical domain, and no 
reason is given why such high standards should be imposed on claims 
about intentions and other mental states. The inconsistency is flagrant 
when the theorist who voices such skepticism about intentions makes all 
sorts of bold claims about such complex topics as the nature of textuality 
and the ways in which readers construct authors. If we can know how 
readers construct things, why can we not know how artists do so? 
A more reasonable worry voiced by anti-intentionalists is that 
intentionalist strictures make the focus of appreciation shift radically 
away from the text or structure and toward the life and mind of the 
artist, the ultimate result being a ratification of the most narrow variety 
of biographical criticism. Although the latter has its rewards, it does not 
yield the only or the most valuable interpretations of an artist's works. 
For example, George Painter's biographical study of Marcel Proust 
certainly sheds some light on Proust's achievement, but interpretations 
by Vincent Descombes, Ren? Girard, and many others are also valuable, 
partly because they elucidate Proust's texts in ways that the writer 
himself would never have done so.7 So if we are to defend some form of 
intentionalism, it should not be one that prescribes only biographical 
approaches or one that prohibits novel and creative interpretations, 
including those that explore the significance that a work takes on 
outside the context of its creation. Part of the solution, then, is to 
observe that interpretations can manifest many different sorts of value. 
Elucidating the meanings and artistic value a work had in its original 
context is one sort of valuable goal, but finding clever, new, and even 
anachronistic ways of using a text can also be worthwhile. It is not clear 
that these two sorts of interpretive projects are always in competition 
with each other. So a premise of any tenable intentionalist theory of 
interpretation is that a valued but not exclusive goal of interpretation is 
the epistemic one of knowing something about the work of art qua work 
of art, and this in its original context of production. The intentionalist 
theses I discuss in the rest of this paper all share this premise. 
IL Fictionalist Intentionalism 
One approach that appeals to many critics is to maintain some sort of 
intentionalist framework while adopting an instrumentalist stance with 
regard to authorship. Looking at the textual evidence relevant to an 
artistic corpus, the interpreter seeks, then, not to build the most realistic 
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possible portrait of the life and works in combination, but to yield an 
interesting and rewarding interpretation of the works, viewed as the 
product of a postulated or fictional author. Such an approach has been 
defended by Alexander Nehamas, for whom the target of interpretation 
is the attitudes of a non-existent, make-believe authorial figure.8 
The sort of fictionalist intentionalism is awkward, I think, because 
there is an unresolved tension between two tendencies. On the one 
hand, the interpreter is supposed to be building a picture of an agent 
whose actions and attitudes explain the genesis of the work, and such a 
process is presumably governed by constraints having to do with 
psychological plausibility. If we really are interested in how works are 
made, we should be interested in the desires, beliefs, intentions, and 
other relevant attitudes of the actual makers, and we should also deem it 
relevant to know whether an attitude has been intentionally expressed 
or has only accidentally been made manifest in the work. Yet in spite of 
its apparent emphasis on artistic agency, fictionalist intentionalism 
describes an interpretive process that is not really aimed at forming a 
hypothesis, not even a selective one, about the actual writer; instead, 
interpreters only imagine or make-believe that the fictional entity they 
describe was responsible for creating the text. As a result, significant 
differences between possible creative histories are effaced. 
Consider, for example, cases where an interpreter holds, solely on the 
basis of evidence that is in principle accessible to members of the 
appropriate audience, that there are artistically significant implicit pat 
terns and meanings in a novel. The history of the work's production 
could have been a matter of three different kinds of processes: (1) the 
implicit meanings could have been intended by the artist, who wanted 
them to be implicitly conveyed by the work; (2) the author may have had 
no such intentions, but ended up writing a text compatible with such a 
reading; or (3) the author may have had such relations in mind, 
intending to make them explicit in the text, but failed to realize this 
intention. The fictionalist intentionalist who is attuned to the implicit 
pattern cannot speak of the differences between these three cases, and 
can only describe the implicit meanings as expressing the intentions of 
a fictionalized author. The actual author's intentions, when successfully 
acted on, do not have any constitutive or evidentiary role in making 
these implicit relations part of the work's artistic content. 
Textual appearances can be deceptive: a text that emerges from a 
chaotic and uncoordinated process of multiple authorship involving the 
efforts of various individuals could look like it resulted from this kind of 
messy history; but on the other hand, it could look like it had been 
intentionally produced by a single author or group of authors acting on 
a reasonably well-conceived and executed scheme.9 Similarly, a text 
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intentionally crafted by a single (or collective) author acting on a well 
conceived and well-executed scheme could look like something emerg 
ing from an uncontrolled process of multiple, uncoordinated contribu 
tions; but it could also look like some author's controlled, intentional 
doing. The interpreter who is oblivious to the intentional or uninten 
tional nature of the actual creative process, as opposed to the text's 
appearances, is not in a position to distinguish between these four 
different kinds of cases. Working with a default assumption in favor of 
intentional creation and expression, the fictionalist runs the risk of 
mistaking accidentally coherent textual meanings for intentionally ex 
pressed attitudes, attributing the latter to a nonexistent creator. 
III. Moderate Intentionalism 
Moderate intentionalism is the thesis that the actual maker(s)' atti 
tudes and doings are responsible for some of a work's content, and as 
such are a legitimate target of interpretive claims; more specifically, 
knowledge of some, but not all intentions is necessary to some, but not 
all valuable interpretive insights because such intentions are sometimes 
constitutive of the work's features or content. Moderate intentionalism 
recognizes that the artist's intentions do not always constitute the work's 
meaning. The contention, rather, is that when intentions are compatible 
with the text, they can be constitutive of a work's implicit meanings. Just 
as hinting and insinuation are part of the pragmatics of everyday 
conversational 
exchange, so do artists sometimes enhance the value of 
their works by expressing attitudes in an implicit and indirect manner. 
In many artistic contexts, subtlety is a valuable feature, and bluntness a 
failing. 
Moderate intentionalism's claims about the implicit meanings of a 
work can be articulated within a broadly Gricean framework where the 
notion of conversational implicature has been adapted so as to develop 
a conception of what could be dubbed "artistic" implicature.10 A key 
claim, then, is that appropriate inferences made within the artist/ 
interpreter relation are guided by assumptions analogous?but certainly 
not identical?to the maxims proposed by Paul Grice with reference to 
everyday conversation. Artistic implicatures, then, are inferences to 
implicit content based on the explicit content of a text or artifact, as well 
as on assumptions shared by artists and their audiences, including 
contextual beliefs and beliefs about the nature of the artist/interpreter 
interaction. For example, authors and interpreters are guided by the 
hypothesis of a "thin" authorial rationality: if an author intends to 
express p implicitly, the author will try to adopt expressive means that 
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are likely to make p manifest to interpreters who are reasonably 
competent at assessing textual and contextual evidence. To that end, the 
author intends to write a text that does not contain p as part of its 
explicit content, a text, however, which will make it possible (if not 
highly likely) for the members of the audience to infer the implicit 
content by relying on both the text and contextual assumptions. What is 
more, when authors try to communicate something implicitly, they 
sometimes intend for their success in realizing this aim to depend on the 
audience's recognition of that intention. A schematic illustration of how 
moderate intentionalist principles may be exemplified in the interpreta 
tion of a work of fiction is provided below in section V. 
IV. Hypothetical Intentionalism 
Moderate intentionalism is, I think, the right way to go, but it is 
important to see how one may defend it against certain challenges. One 
objection that appears frequently in the literature takes the following 
form. Take some literary text or artistic structure that is well known and 
that is generally recognized as having valuable and complex meanings, 
and imagine that we were to discover that the artist in question 
produced the work while acting on only some very limited semantic 
intentions. Does not moderate intentionalism then have the crippling 
consequence of requiring us to limit our understanding of the work's 
original, artistic meanings to the ones intended by the artist? And why 
should we want to do this when the interest and value of the work would 
appear to suffer as a result? In Jerrold Levinson's version of this 
challenge, we are asked to imagine that we discover that Franz Kafka's 
intentions with 
regard to "Ein Landarzt" were simply a matter of 
critiquing rural medical practices. Should we not reject any hermeneu 
tic principle that would have the deflationary consequence of forcing us 
to ignore the rich symbolic dimensions of Kafka's story?11 
The idea behind this sort of challenge and the examples that are used 
to illustrate it is that some artist's intentions can detract from the value 
or interest of a work, and that a theory of interpretation should provide 
a principled way of ruling them out. An approach along these lines is 
ably defended by Levinson, who follows William Tolhurst in speaking of 
hypothetical intentionalism.12 Crucial to this approach is a distinction 
between two main kinds of intentions, labeled "semantic" and "categorial" 
by Levinson. Speaking quickly, Levinson proposes that categorial inten 
tions can determine a work's features and therefore have a constitutive 
status, while semantic ones cannot and are at best suggestive of a work's 
meanings. Whenever heeding someone's semantic intentions would 
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make the interpretation less interesting and the work less valuable, we 
should overrule them in favor of a superior interpretation that is 
compatible with the textual and contextual data. In the case of the Kafka 
example, Levinson's strictures would have us rule out Kafka's inferior 
semantic intentions while retaining our crucial knowledge of his larger 
categorial aims. 
Such an approach obviously hinges on the distinction between 
semantic and categorial intentions, which is drawn, first of all, on the 
basis of the contents of intentions, and involves, more specifically, the 
aspects of the work of art that the artist has in mind. As Levinson puts it, 
categorial intentions "govern not what a work is to mean but how it is to 
be fundamentally conceived or approached" (1188). In one of Levinson's 
examples, the intention to make a sculpture and have it be taken as such 
is categorial, while the intention to express rage with this work of art is 
semantic.13 
Why should categorial intentions have a different status in a theory of 
interpretation? In what follows, I survey various potential reasons, 
contending that on closer inspection, they do not in fact justify the use 
made of the distinction in hypothetical intentionalism. 
One potential reason for a difference in status has to do with reliability. 
Perhaps the two kinds of intentions have significantly different functions 
in the creative process, in which case interpreters who follow the 
principles of hypothetical intentionalism are attuned to an important 
difference. Levinson writes that categorial intentions are decisive or 
determinative of a work's features in a way that semantic intentions are 
not. He points out that semantic intentions often fail?as a result, say, of 
clumsiness or mistaken beliefs. He then adds: "But if the writer intends 
his text as a poem?as opposed to a short story, a dramatic monologue, a 
piece of calligraphic visual art, or a mere diary entry?then that 
intention is of a different sort and of a different order, and virtually 
cannot fail?so long as the text in question at least allows of being taken, 
among other things, as a poem" (I 188). In the same context, Levinson 
goes on to say that semantic intentions do not "determine" meaning, 
while categorial intentions "do in general determine how a text is to be 
conceptualized and approached on a fundamental level and thus 
indirectly affect what it will resultingly say or express" (I 189). And that, 
presumably, is a reason, perhaps even a sufficient reason, why semantic 
intentions should have only a suggestive role in the construction of 
interpretive hypotheses, while categorial ones have an "evidential role." 
Levinson says semantic intentions can fail; categorial ones virtually 
cannot fail. Does this phrase mean that they do, sometimes, fail? So it 
would seem. Levinson allows that both categorial and semantic inten 
tions are fallible, so the reliability of the former is no reason for granting 
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the two a logically distinct status in our theory of interpretation. Perhaps 
Levinson's point in this regard is that it is in general easier to realize 
categorial intentions, and that semantic intentions are more likely to 
misfire. Yet even this more modest thesis is not so obvious. Some 
categorial intentions may, in some contexts, be very hard to realize; and 
some semantic intentions are easy to pull off. Degree of difficulty and 
likelihood of success do not in any case correspond in any simple way to 
whether knowledge of someone's aims has constitutive or merely 
suggestive value with regard to their actual achievement. 
A version of the intentional fallacy pertains to categorial intentions 
just as much as it does to semantic ones. We cannot infer from 
someone's having a categorial intention that it has been successfully 
realized in the work, even if the agent is known to have acted on that 
intention. Nor can we automatically infer back from features of a 
realized text or artistic structure to the relevant 
categorial intentions. A 
writer shows us a sonnet he has authored. Can we conclude, therefore, 
that the author categorially intended to write a sonnet and intentionally 
did so? The argument is invalid, even if we are willing to set aside cases 
of wayward causality. The author could have been trying to realize a 
specific categorial intention incompatible with the poem's actually 
being a sonnet. 
Levinson allows that categorial intentions are decisive or determinant 
only if the text "allows of being taken" that way. The same sort of 
constraint can be placed on our use of facts about semantic intentions: 
a semantic intention is to be deemed decisive of a work's content only if 
the text "allows of being taken" that way. Semantic intentions do not, 
indeed, succeed "by fiat," but neither do categorial ones. In both cases, 
recognition of the artist's constitutive role is constrained by facts about 
what the writer has 
managed to do in producing a text. Moderate 
intentionalism can make use of the same insight, holding that intentions 
of any stripe are decisive only if they are textually or structurally 
compatible, that is, if they are consistent with the features of the work's 
text or artistic structure. Successful realization of intention is, in both 
cases, a matter of intentionally producing something compatible with 
the content of the intention.14 
Reliability, or degree thereof, turns out not to be the key to any 
important difference in status between the two kinds of intention, and 
therefore not a decisive reason for preferring hypothetical intentionalism 
over moderate intentionalism. Are there other reasons? One candidate 
to consider has to do with accessibility or epistemic access: perhaps 
categorial intentions are more readily known, while semantic ones 
are 
elusive. Yet once we are in the business of making claims about the 
respective contents of intentions, we are in no position to say that 
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semantic intentions are inscrutable creatures of the mentalistic night, 
while categorial ones are solid and scrutable features of objective 
behavior. We manage to know both sorts of intention?when, that is, we 
do manage to know them at all?in the same way. Some categorial 
intentions are, in any case, very hard to fathom. What precisely was the 
categorial intention of Apuleius when he wrote the last part of The 
Golden Ass? To write a parody, or something else entirely? What, exactly, 
were Virginia WoolFs categorial intentions when she wrote Orlando? 
Which of the passages in Franz Kafka's notebooks were meant to be just 
diary entries, and which parts were intended to be works of literary 
fiction? What were his categorial intentions when he interrupted his 
writing to draw sketches in these notebooks? Did these three writers 
successfully realize their categorial intentions, whatever they were? 
Puzzling questions, as Baudelaire sometimes said. 
Another unjustified asymmetry in the treatment of the two kinds of 
intentions concerns their implications for a work's value. If a semantic 
intention would lead to a lower estimate of the work's value, it should be 
disregarded. Yet the hypothetical intentionalist does not think that 
unfortunate or unsuccessful categorial intentions should be similarly 
replaced. For example, the hypothetical intentionalist does not agree to 
replace Ed Wood's serious categorial intent with a more appropriate 
parodie one, thereby improving on his film. Why not? Perhaps because 
it is important to recognize that it is the artist who creates the work and 
its artistic value, as opposed to the critic or theorist. It seems plausible to 
think that the latter premise should apply to semantic intentions as well. 
Another problem with hypothetical intentionalism is that the distinc 
tion is not sharp enough to be used the way this theory of interpretation 
prescribes. Can we in practice sort out the contents of various intentions 
involved in the making of works of art, deciding that some are categorial 
and others not, and giving constitutive status only to the former? It looks 
like there are some clear-cut cases where the rule can be applied fairly 
easily, but a lot of cases where it cannot. 
The intention to make a work of art as opposed to something else may 
be an 
example of a clear-cut case, assuming we have a successful analysis 
of the art/nonart distinction and of the place of intentions therein. 
And, with regard to at least some of the more specific art forms, the 
same could be true. It seems plausible, for example, to say that an artist 
can have the intention of 
making a sculpture, even a representational 
one, without having any idea what the sculpture will represent. He 
intends to figure that out once he has his hands in the clay. We may even 
want to say that he categorially intends to develop his semantic inten 
tions later, in which case the categorial intention is a "second-order" 
intention quite unlike a first-order semantic one.15 
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Are there semantic intentions devoid of categorial contents? Perhaps. 
Stirred by a powerful emotion of rage, the artist intends to express it, but 
has no other intentions with regard to how this will be done. Like Pier 
Paolo Pasolini, he is very versatile. Perhaps he will make a movie; 
perhaps he will write a political poem, or maybe he will make a sculpture 
depicting some angry workers. It could be, though, that the intention to 
make a work expressing rage must involve at least a negative categorial 
component: intending to communicate a sense of outrage, the artist 
cannot intend to make a purely decorative or minimalist work. A sonata 
for dog whistle probably will not do. 
Even if we allow that some intentions can be sorted nearly, the friend 
of hypothetical intentionalism must help us deal with the messy cases, 
and I suspect there are a lot of them. Consider the intention to make a 
work of fiction (as opposed, say, to some sort of nonfictional work). On 
some prominent accounts, the intention to have members of an 
audience 
recognize that a text or structure has a certain propositional 
content is a necessary component of the larger fiction-making inten 
tion.16 If such 
analyses are correct, the relevant intention is a mixed 
affair, having categorial and semantic components. Or consider a 
writer's intention to write a novel belonging to a trilogy, where the 
intention, more specifically, is to create various meaningful, implicit 
relations between the characters in the three novels. The writer intends 
for the readers to think about the successive protagonists "as if they 
were continuations of a single type of person.17 It seems hard to separate 
the categorial and semantic aspects of the content of such an intention, 
or cluster of interrelated intentions. Can we truly isolate the artist's goal 
of making works that are part of a trilogy from the meanings that in his 
mind constitute the links between the stories related in the three works? 
Given such cases, how are we to apply an interpretive principle that 
instructs us to exclude 
"any fact about the author's actual mental state or 
attitude during composition, in particular what I have called his 
semantic intentions for a text" (I 206)? Perhaps any intention having a 
categorial component should be recognized, even if it is "contaminated" 
by semantic elements. Or should we, on the contrary, decide that a 
categorial intention involving a semantic component is merely "sugges 
tive" and not constitutive? Both solutions seem arbitrary. The latter 
sacrifices important categorial intentions in order to screen out the 
semantic intentions; the former violates the clause about excluding 
semantic intentions. Moderate intentionalism, which places no great 
weight on the distinction between categorial and semantic intentions, 
does not face such a problem. Yet moderate intentionalism is attuned to 
other distinctions between intentions, beginning with the difference 
between intentions that are never acted on (such as an artist's aban 
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doned musings about what she plans to do at some point in the future), 
and those that are acted on and actually orient the artist's work in a 
medium. In some cases, the action involved is a mental one, and what 
the artist does is to make a decision, thereby constituting the work in a 
particular manner.18 Such intentions cannot countervene facts about the 
actual text or structure that has been produced, but when no such 
conflict obtains, they can decisively inform both the artist's and critic's 
thinking about the work. Such, at least, is the key claim of moderate 
intentionalism. 
V. A Test Case 
As a result of his commitment to the uptake of the actual artist's 
categorical intentions, Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism differs 
from the kind of fictionalist intentionalism that I discussed earlier, but it 
is not clear that his approach avoids all of its problems. We can see this 
if we focus on a case where the hypothetical intentionalist disregards the 
actual author's semantic intentions. Suppose we have a work of prose 
fiction where the words and sentences in the text, standardly and 
literally interpreted in a holistic way, are compatible with at least two 
significant and incompatible interpretations, each of which appears to 
provide an excellent, if not optimal, reading of the work. In one 
reading, Rl, the governess who is the narrator of the work's embedded 
tale is really quite mad; it is true in the story that she wrongly believes 
and 
sincerely narrates that there are ghosts in the manor. In the other, 
rival reading, R2, of which the text also allows, this narrator is distraught, 
but not deluded; she detects and reports the presence of supernatural 
beings, and it is true in the story that these malevolent entities exist. 
Now, suppose as well that the author is known to have intended the 
latter reading. He aimed at creating a ghost story in which the horrors 
would be more terrible because presented only indirectly through the 
report of an observer. As he put it, "prodigies, when they come straight, 
come with an effect imperilled; they keep all their character, on the 
other hand, by looming through some other history."19 That is why he 
penned a text in which we only hear about the ghosts through the 
account of the governess; the reading of that account is, in any case, 
clearly framed as part of an exchange of ghost stories. And it just so 
happens that the author's contemporaries, including such astute read 
ers as Virginia Woolf, knew all this and never hesitated to call the work 
a ghost story.20 
With regard to such a case, moderate, actual intentionalism rules that 
R2 alone is right; this is a ghost story, albeit one where the ghosts are 
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only implicitly presented. This reading is supported by reference to the 
text and to both the writer's semantic intentions and the related, 
categorial intentions. 
What does a hypothetical intentionalist say about such a case? A first 
problem is that of sorting out the intentions. Is the author's intention to 
make ghosts part of the story a purely semantic intention? What is its 
relation to the categorial intention of writing a certain type of story, 
namely, a ghost story? How could the author have framed the latter 
intention without also having some sort of semantic intention relevant 
to the presence of ghosts in the tale? It looks like a case of a single, 
mixed intention, not two significantly distinct aims. In that case, an 
interpreter working with hypothetical intentionalism has to decide 
whether the semantic aspect disqualifies the intention. I have not been 
able to find a principled basis for making such a decision (given, of 
course, the text's compatibility with the relevant intentions). 
Suppose the hypothetical intentionalist determines that the author's 
intention to write a ghost story is a separate, purely categorial one. In 
that case he or she should agree that R2 is correct. But let us stipulate 
that the facts in the case are different, and that the author had only 
semantic intentions about there being ghosts in the story (ghosts, that is, 
that would loom through some other history). We stipulate, then, that 
the author had no related, categorial intentions about the work being a 
ghost story of some kind.21 The example is, we suppose, logically and 
psychologically possible: let the author be a super-Crocean having the 
deluded belief that his semantic and other artistic aims are unique. Now, 
in that case, the interpreter who follows the strictures of hypothetical 
intentionalism should not let the fact about the semantic intention tip 
the scales in favor of R2. The work is, instead, seen to be ambiguous 
between Rl and R2; its meaning is their exclusive disjunction. 
At this point another feature of Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism 
should be noted. The meanings discovered are now attributed to the 
actual author?only hypothetically so. Being intended, the h?sitation has 
a different status than it would have had had one decided that it was an 
ambiguity resulting from authorial failure or ineptitude. The work is 
better when we abandon the latter hypothesis in favor of the former, and 
we are 
right to appreciate it as such.22 So although I know that the actual 
author wrote the story with semantic intentions, I hypothesize?but do 
not feign or imagine?an author who did not have those intentions, but 
who intended for the work to be ambiguous. I do this because actual 
semantic intentions are not constitutive, and because the work has 
greater artistic value when I work with this hypothesis about the author's 
intentions. 
So in this instance hypothetical and moderate intentionalism do not 
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converge; instead, they present us with a choice between two rival 
interpretive conclusions: 
(MI) the author meant to imply the presence of ghosts in the story, 
and since the text can be squared with that intention, the author 
successfully did so, and R2 is correct; 
(HI) the hypothetical actual author's intention is a story ambiguous 
between the narrator's madness and sanity; the exclusive disjunction 
(Rl or R2) and not (Rl and R2), is correct. 
What reasons can we given to justify a choice between the principles 
yielding these two options? Basically, the accounts differ with regard to 
what they claim about the relation betweeen the work's causal history 
and its meanings. Hypothetical intentionalism is selective about what 
facts and evidence relevant to that causal history can be decisive in an 
account of 
meaning. As the actual author's semantic intentions are not 
decisive (given the text's ambiguity), the hypothetical actual author is 
determined to be someone who intended to write an ambiguous tale. 
Ambiguity cannot, it would seem, be an unintended feature of the work's 
content. 
Why should the possibility of recognizing unintended semantic ambi 
guity matter? Why, more generally, should we care about the relation 
between the work's causal history and its meanings? The answers rest on 
assumptions that are, I think, shared by friends of hypothetical and 
moderate intentionalism. Conclusions about 
meanings are often rele 
vant to judgments concerning the artist's achievement. Someone who 
tries to write a straightforward, unambiguous story, but ends up writing 
something that everyone reads as involving a complex rhetoric of 
unreliable narration, may have written something fascinating to read; 
but this person's work should not be prized as the artistic achievement 
of devising an unreliable narration. We want an interpretive theory that 
is attuned to the difference between glorious serendipity and unfortu 
nate failures, as well as the difference between the skillful realization of 
valuable and difficult aims and the routine realization of lowly or 
mediocre goals.23 Ambiguity, or lack thereof, is one such relevant aim. 
Our appreciation of artists' achievements in this respect depends on our 
working with an explanation of the work's genesis that is as accurate as 
the evidence allows, an ideal to which the selective overruling of 
semantic intentions is inimical. To echo Levinson's own phrases, artists 
should not be allowed to make a work mean, by fiat, whatever they want 
them to mean; yet critics should not, by selective weighing of evidence, 
convert unintended meanings into intended ones, not even "by hypothesis," 
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because this sort of move obscures the historical role of semantic 
intentions, including unsuccessful ones, in the making of the work. 
Conclusion 
The moderate intentionalist holds that the theory of appreciation and 
interpretation should be attuned to the artist's constitutive role in the 
making of works. It is the artist who, within "natural and logical limits," 
makes the work, and choosing and settling on categories and meanings 
is part of that creative process. We ought to reject the criticism 
promoting idea that it is the reader who invents the story; we prefer, 
instead, a communicative model in which the reader attempts to 
discover the nature of the story as told, acknowledging that it is the 
storyteller who, within limits and contingent on his or her ability, 
decides what happens in the story he or she is going to tell, including 
events that need not, for various reasons, be related directly in the text. 
Hypothetical intentionalism suffers from the problem that we do not 
have any systematic way to separate the categorial wheat from the 
semantic chaff. What is more, it is not even obvious that we have any 
good grounds for trying to do so. Some intentions are inextricably 
semantic and categorial; some chaff is categorial, and there is semantic 
wheat to be harvested. If the works of art that actual authors have 
created are the prime target of an interpretive hypothesis, then we 
should let all of the available evidence about the causal history of the 
artistic structure have the same, initial status. Part of that history is a 
matter of the semantic intentions on which the artist has successfully or 
unsuccessfully acted.24 Sometimes the author's semantic intentions are 
less limited than the meanings a reader may be able to dream up on the 
basis of the text and other background evidence. Sometimes interviews 
and diaries open up all sorts of wonderful undiscovered meanings. We 
can indeed imagine a Kafka whose diary reveals stupid semantic 
intentions, but we can also actually read the remarkable diaries of the 
real Franz Kafka. What is harder to imagine is why critics should be 
required to refrain from allowing their interpretations of Kafka's works 
to be in any way guided by an interpretation of these fascinating diaries 
and other evidence relevant to the actual author's thoughts and 
experience. Recognizing that in some cases limited or boring semantic 
intentions are decisive of a work's features is the price we pay for an 
interpretive principle that allows us, on other, happier occasions, to 
recognize that the artist's laudable and complex aims were decisive. 
?rhus University 
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